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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
DEBORAH WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050190-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a refusal to bind over on a charge of issuing a bad check, a 
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004), in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Steven 
L. Hansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1999) and State 
v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 54-55 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION, 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the magistrate incorrectly refused to bind over a charge of issuing a bad 
check where evidence amply showed that defendant knew the check would not be paid? 
Preservation'. This issue was preserved by the magistrate's order dismissing the 
charges. R. 191-88. (A copy of the Order is contained in Addendum C.) 
Standard of Review: "[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over 
for trial presents a question of law," State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425,429 (Utah App. 1997), 
which is reviewed "without deference to the court below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8, 
20P.3d300. 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-20-11 (1953, as amended); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505 (1973); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with issuing a bad check, a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004) (counts 1 and 2) 
communications fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1801 (West 2004) (counts 3 and 4), and pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1603 (West 2004) (count 5). R4-1.1 Her husband, 
George Wallace, was also charged with associated offenses (counts 6-11). Id. A preliminary 
hearing was held before the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, acting as a magistrate under rule 
7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the magistrate took the matter of bindover on all 
charges under advisement. R58-57; 196:81-83. Defendant moved to dismiss all counts. 
Rl07-99. Following a hearing, the magistrate issued a memorandum decision wherein it 
1
 The magistrate's dismissal of charges against George Wallace is the subject of a 
separate State's appeal, case number 20050192-CA. 
3 
concluded that the State had failed to establish every element of each of the charged offenses. 
R139; 150-141 "Memorandum Decision" (Addendum B); R198, transcript of October 19, 
2004 hearing on defendant's motion ("dismissal hearing"). The prosecutor moved the 
magistrate to reconsider. Rl 66-152. The magistrate issued a second memorandum decision 
wherein it concluded the State had not presented any argument to modify the magistrate's 
prior decision. R186. On January 31, 2005, the magistrate issued its order dismissing all 
charges. R191-188 ("Order") (Addendum C). The State timely filed a notice of appeal on 
February 24, 2005. R193. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In two and one-half years defendant and her husband wrote 254 checks on 
twelve bank accounts, aggregating to more than $450,000 
Count 2 - Issuing a Bad Check - Deborah Wallace 
Count 7- Theft by Deception - George Wallace2 
On the morning of July 18, 2002, defendant called Sharon Warner at her home in 
Springville, from which she worked for Morris Murdock Travel ("Morris Murdock"). 
R196:46-48. Defendant asked Ms. Warner to get her eleven tickets for flights the next day 
to Hawaii. Rl 96:47. In response to Ms. Warner's surprise about the late call, defendant said 
she had already made arrangements with Pleasant Hawaii Holidays. However, she did not 
have a credit card, and because of the last-minute arrangements, Ms. Warner, "with Morris 
2
 Facts related to charges against George Wallace (count's 6-11) are set out as 
they are generally the same facts supporting defendant's charges. The State intends to 
move to consolidate the Wallaces' cases. Facts supporting counts 1 and 3 through 11 are 
relevant to this State's appeal of the magistrate's refusal to bind defendant over on count 
2 and are set out accordingly. 
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behind [her], would have the clout" to expedite the ticket arrangement. She also explained 
that she wanted Ms. Warner to receive the commission, about $1500. Rl96)47-48. Ms. 
Warner, with Morris's vice president's approval, agreed, and asked for cash. R196:48. 
Defendant said she did not have the money at that point, but that she would on Tuesday. Id. 
Defendant then requested that Ms. Warner take a check and post-date it to the coming 
Tuesday. Id. Early that afternoon, both defendant and George Wallace delivered a check for 
$11,496.30, andthankedMs. Warner with a "big hug." R196:49. The Wallaces left the next 
day. R196:52. 
Although the check was actually dated "July 17," Ms. Warner did not try to cash it 
until Tuesday. Rl96:49. When she called the bank, she learned that there were insufficient 
funds to cover the check. Id. Ms. Warner waited another day or two and then called 
defendant on her cell phone in Hawaii. Rl96:49-50. When Ms. Warner expressed her 
concern, defendant said, "Oh, the money is coming any time. Just hold off a few more days." 
Rl 96:50. Ms. Warner reported, "This went on for several weeks" and always with the same 
refrain: "[S]ome money is coming... and it was always a big amount... that would cover 
this." R196:50-51. She usually spoke with defendant. Id. At some point, Ms. Warner 
deposited the check, and it was returned for insufficient funds. R196:50. 
Lynette Ambrose, a paralegal in Morris Murdock's legal department, spoke frequently 
with defendant in trying to collect on the check. R196:53-54. Most of her telephone 
conversations were also with defendant. Rl96:54. The Wallaces also made out two more 
checks, totaling $1,860, to Morris Meetings, a subsidiary of Morris Murdock, for admission 
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fees to a Nu Skin convention. Id. Both of those checks "bounced." Id. At the time of the 
preliminary hearing, the Wallaces still owed Morris Murdock $14,196.30. Id. 
Mr. O'Bryant testified that the check to Morris Murdock was written on a different 
Far West account owned by Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC, a similar sounding account to 
Imi Kaimana Investments. R196:13-14. That check was for $11,496.30. Id. There was 
never enough money in that account to cover the check "[b]y a large margin—[tjhousands 
of dollars." R196:15. 
Defendant's conduct in issuing an insufficient funds check with a promise to repay 
in the near future described a regular, long-standing pattern of defendant and her husband 
with numerous other victims. Accordingly, the facts giving rise to the other dismissed 
charges against both defendants are set out accordingly. At the preliminary hearing, Toby 
O'Bryant, an investigator who had investigated about a hundred white-collar crimes, 
presented an overview of the prosecution's case. R196:5-27. He testified that on November 
4,2002, he met with eight individuals who had been "relieved of some money in one fashion 
or another [by the Wallaces], some by insufficient funds checks, some by borrowing the 
money and not paying it back as promised." R196:5-8. These and other individuals and 
business entities claimed the Wallaces owed them more than $450,000. R196:8,10; State's 
Ex. 3. Mr. O'Bryant subpoenaed fourteen bank accounts and looked at twelve of them. 
R196:9. Except for one of those accounts, all existed for only a year or two. Id. The 
Wallaces accumulated "a number of returned checks, overdraft and bank fees, and left 
deficits in closing amounts when [the accounts] were terminated by the banks." Id. The 
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accounts were terminated involuntarily. Rl 96:10. Between January 2000 and July 2002, the 
Wallaces wrote from those accounts 254 checks that were returned for insufficient funds. 
R196:9-10. 
Count I - Issuing a Bad Check - Deborah Wallace 
Count 6 - Theft by Deception - George Wallace 
Edward Martinez had known the Wallaces, as neighbors in Springville, for six or 
seven years at the time of the preliminary hearing. George Wallace had also represented Mr. 
Martinez in a custody matter concerning Mr. Martinez's father. R196:33-34. Shortly after 
that matter was concluded, Wallace asked if Mr. Martinez would lend him $10,000 for an 
investment Wallace was working on. Rl 96:34. On July 2,2001, Mr. Martinez and his father-
in-law, Donald Horton, met with Wallace at Wallace's home, and they each loaned him 
$10,000. R196:34-36. The note for the 90-day, twelve-percent (12%) loan required Wallace 
to repay the principal, plus approximately $2,450, by September 30, 2001. R196:36. Mr. 
Martinez received a promissory note and a pledge agreement in support of the transaction. 
Id. He also received a modified promissory note, directing Wallace to pay an additional 
thirty percent (30%) if the note was not paid by February 2002. Rl 96:36-37. Mr. Martinez 
trusted Wallace out of defendant's earlier association with him. R196:34. 
Wallace did not repay the loan by September 30. R196:37. When Mr. Martinez and 
Mr. Horton inquired about their money, Wallace said that he had a '"big deal' ready to come 
through this Tuesday or Wednesday," at which point the Wallaces would have their money. 
Id. Wallace also asked Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton to extend the loan, but they declined. 
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R196:37-38. Although the day of the alleged "big deal" came and went, Wallace failed to 
pay the loans. R196:38. At first, Mr. Martinez called the Wallaces on behalf of himself and 
Mr. Horton every other week, and later, every week. Id. Each time they received the same 
familiar refrain: We have a "big deal" coming through and "[w]e should have your money 
for you by this next Tuesday or Wednesday." Id. But each time, Wednesday came and went 
without payment. Id. 
On December 4, 2001, Mr. Martinez received a $10,000 check from the Wallaces. 
Id. He was still owed interest of $3,306.24. R196:38-39. 
On July 17, 2002, after trying to get the rest of their money back, the Martinezes and 
the Hortons happened to drive by the Wallaces' residence. Rl96:40. There they saw a 
moving van, an overseas or overland shipping container, and people moving furniture. Id. 
Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton entered the house and asked the Wallaces what they were 
doing. Rl96:40-41. The Wallaces said they were moving to Hawaii. Rl96:41. Mr. 
Martinez said he and Mr. Horton would like to get paid before the Wallaces left. Id. 
Defendant said, "That won't be a problem," and she wrote a check to Mr. Martinez for 
$3,000 and a check to Mr. Horton for $13,000. R196:41, 43. When Mr. Martinez noticed 
the interest on his check was short, defendant wrote an additional check for $301.24. 
R196:42-43. The checks were dated, "July 17,2002." Id. Defendant requested that they not 
cash the checks until Tuesday or Wednesday because "[w]e should have plenty of money in 
there by Tuesday or Wednesday." Rl96:41-42. Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton agreed and 
did not try to cash the checks until July 22, as defendant requested. Id. On July 22, Mr. 
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Martinez called the bank and learned that none of the checks would clear the account. 
Rl 96:42-43. Days later, on the advice of a police officer, Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton 
deposited the checks, but only the one for $301.24 cleared the account. R196:43-44; State's 
Ex. 4, Donald Horton's 1102 statement. Mr. Martinez acknowledged, on cross-examination, 
that defendant had repaid three prior loans Mr. Martinez made to him. Rl 96:45. 
Mr. O'Bryant testified that the $13,000 check to Mr. Horton was written on a Far 
West account belonging to Imi Kaimana Investments, LLC, on which George Wallace was 
the only endorser. R196:11-12. The account never had funds close to $13,000, either before 
or after it was written. R196:12. The account was involuntarily closed on August 12,2002, 
less than a month after the check was written. Id. 
Count 4 - Communications Fraud - Deborah Wallace 
Count 10 - Communications Fraud- George Wallace 
In 1996, Jeanne Stonely and her husband sold their house in Springville to the 
Wallaces. R196:71-72. The contract set out a schedule of gradual monthly payments: from 
$1,663.78, beginning in September 1997, to $2,148.49 by August 1,2001, at which time the 
Wallaces promised to pay off all principal and interest then owed. Rl96:72-73; State's Ex. 
2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 statement, Ex. A and P.3 
The Wallaces began to fall short on their payments in September 1997. R196:73. 
After the Wallaces failed to pay anything for several months, Ms. Stonely contacted them. 
Id. Because Ms. Stonely trusted the Wallaces, she constantly "fell prey" to their explanations 
3
 The 1102 statement of Jeanne Stonely, bearing on counts 4 and 10 (State's Ex. 2) was 
received without objection. R59; 196:19-20. 
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and claims that her money would be forthcoming. Id. Eventually, the Stonelys, who were 
then in Canada, sent the Wallaces a demand letter, which was never acknowledged. 
Rl96:74. The Wallaces had apparently left the house, but left no forwarding address. Id. 
The Stonelys, however, still had the Wallaces' cell phone number. Whenever they spoke, 
either defendant or George Wallace would promise that the money was forthcoming. Id. 
Because the Wallaces were short on their payments, the Stonelys could not make their 
mortgage payments. Id. "The pressure was on," and the Stonelys needed to regain 
possession of the house. Id. The Stonelys hired an attorney and regained possession of the 
house by receiving a warranty deed from the Wallaces. R196:74-75. 
The Stonelys incurred other expenses after receiving the warranty deed. Rl96:75. 
The Stonelys changed the locks and engaged a realtor to sell the house. Id. The Wallaces 
did not leave the house in good condition; it needed a great deal of cleaning and repairs for 
wear-and-tear, costing between $700 and $800. R196:75-76. The yard needed attention, and 
Ms. Stonely paid her children to take care of it. Rl 96:75. Although she was not sure that 
the warranty deed explicitly addressed the matter, she and the Wallaces understood that she 
would forgive the Wallaces' outstanding debt on the house if the house was left in good 
condition. R196:76. She also paid $3,000 in back taxes accrued by the Wallaces over four 
years. Id. Between September 1997 and April 2002, the Wallaces missed eighteen payments 
entirely and where short on twenty-two payments, a deficit totaling $51,111.13. R100; 
State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 statement. 
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Count 9 - Issuing a bad check - George Wallace 
The Tradewinds Estate ("Tradewinds") is owned by Mr. David Thielen, who does 
business under the name of the Tradewinds by renting the estate. State's Ex. 1, 1102 
statement of Peggy Young, Tradewinds' booking agent.4 In March 2002, the Wallaces 
began negotiations with Mr. Thielen to rent the Tradewinds on the island of Oahu in Hawaii. 
R196:15. The Wallaces signed a rental agreement, dated June 17, 2002, to rent the estate 
for $8,000 a month beginning July 1, 2002. R196:15-16; State's Ex. 1, 1102 statement of 
Peggy Young, booking manager for Tradewinds. Defendant wrote a check for $8,500 to 
Tradewinds to cover the initial deposit, plus a late fee, on the estate. State's Ex. 1. That 
check did not clear.5 State's Ex. 1. Defendant wired $7,500 to Tradewinds and covered the 
remaining deposit and late fee with another individual's credit card.6 State's Ex. 1. 
Thereafter, on July 19, 2002, George Wallace wrote a check to Tradewinds for $3,096.84 
to partially cover the first month's rent. State's Ex. 1. That check too, the basis for count 
9, was returned for insufficient funds. R196:15, 17-19; State's Ex. 1. A rental fee of 
4
 The 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1) was 
received without objection. R59; 196:18-19. 
5
 Defendant was not charged with an offense with respect to this insufficient funds 
check. 
6
 The Wallaces were also individually charged in this case with communications 
fraud against Catryna Faux and her husband based on credit advances made to the 
Wallaces while the two couples were in Hawaii. R3-2; 196:55-70; State's Ex. 5. The 
facts of those charges are not discussed in this brief. 
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$14,250 was still owed on the estate even after the Wallaces later wired approximately 
$8,000 to Tradewinds. R196:25-26. 
Prosecutorial judgment that Wallace's acted criminally 
From his investigation, Mr. O'Bryant considered that the Wallaces should be charged 
criminally and that their activities should not be regarded as isolated instances of a bad 
checks and unfortunate circumstances that should have been handled civilly: 
[T]he volume of complaint was one matter that concerned me greatly. This 
wasn't just a mistake here and there, a dropped decimal point or a 
miscalculation in a checkbook. This was an overall long-term pattern of 
development through 12 accounts of juggling monies, moving one temporarily 
into one to pay for something that didn't exist. There was just not enough 
money in any of those accounts to do the kinds of things they were doing 
financially. 
R196:20. From what Mr. O'Bryant could tell from the accounts he examined, he thought 
the Wallaces were living well beyond their means. Id. The Wallaces also personally 
admitted to Mr. O'Bryant that a "Restitution/Victim List, was "fairly accurate." R196:30-
32; State's Ex. 3. The list compiled the Wallaces indebtedness to numerous persons and 
entities, including victims of the charged offenses, totaling $457,379.79. State's Ex. 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate incorrectly refused to bind defendant over on the theft by deception 
charge based on defendant's issuing a bad check to Morris Murdock (Count 7). The 
magistrate incorrectly read the charge to require a showing of fraudulent intent, rather than 
recognizing that the bad check statute required only that evidence show that defendant knew 
that the check would not be paid. The magistrate also failed to view the evidence and the 
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reasonable inferences arising from that evidence most favorably to the prosecution. The 
current bad check statute requires that the actor issue the check "knowing"—being 
"reasonably certain"—that it will not be paid. Here, defendant and her husband had issued 
hundreds of bad checks during the preceding two and one-half years, they were under 
enormous financial pressure from numerous unpaid obligations, and at the time of 
preliminary hearing they owed over $450,000. Additionally, there was undisputed testimony 
that there was never enough money in the account to cover the check by thousands of dollars 
and that all of defendant's bank accounts reviewed by a State investigator—twelve 
accounts—were soon involuntarily closed. Nevertheless, defendant and her husband 
repeatedly lulled their numerous victims, without results, with stories that they expected 
substantial funds in the near future. All of this evidence, viewed favorably to the 
prosecution, provided sufficient probable cause to bind defendant over for issuing a bad 
check. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO BIND OVER 
DEFENDANT ON THE CHARGE THAT SHE ISSUED A BAD CHECK 
TO MORRIS MURDOCK WHERE THE EVIDENCE AND ITS 
INFERENCES SUPPORTED A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT 
DEFENDANT KNEW IT WOULD NOT BE PAID 
Defendant was charged with two counts of issuing a bad check (counts 1 and 2), two 
counts of communications fraud (counts 3 and 4), and one count of pattern of unlawful 
activity (count 5). R4-1. After all parties submitted memoranda, and after a hearing, the 
magistrate dismissed all charges. R139, 191-188. The State does not dispute the 
13 
magistrate's dismissal of count 1 (issuing a bad check to Martinez and Horton), count 3 
(devising a scheme to defraud the Fauxs), count 4 (devising a scheme to defraud the 
Stonelys), and count 5 (pattern of unlawful activity). As explained below, however, the 
reasonable inferences arising from the evidence established a "reasonable belief that 
defendant committed all the elements of count 2, issuing a bad check to Morris Murdock. 
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over on this charge should therefore be 
reversed. 
A. The Bindover Standard. 
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a 
preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f^ 
10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (additional 
internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,437 
(Utah 1998). Thus, "to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must. . . produce 
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f^ 15 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a 
bindover is the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at f^ 16. Under both 
standards, the prosecution need only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
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In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant 
committed each element of the charged offense, "[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the prosecution." Id. at f^ 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 3, 26 P.3d 223 
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution"). "[W]hen faced with 
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave 
those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 10 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted) (alteration in original). "It is not for the [magistrate] at a preliminary 
hearing to accept the defendant's version of the facts over the legitimate inferences which 
can be drawn from the [State's] evidence." People v. District Court of Colorado's 
Seventeenth Judicial District, 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990) {en banc) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives rise to alternative reasonable 
inferences, the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the State's case. See 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternate 
inferences - one suggesting innocence and the other guilt - viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, evidence supported probable cause); see also Hawatmeh, 2001 
UT 51, 1^ 13 ("Although defendants' characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly 
inferred from the evidence, there are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and 
the facts do not negate the reasonable inferences presented by the State"). In short, "'unless 
the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue 
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which supports the [prosecution's] claim,' the magistrate should bind the defendant over for 
trial." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)) 
(brackets in original); accord State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f^ 10, 44 P.3d 730. 
B. The State produced believable evidence that defendant 
issued a bad check to Morris Murdock (count 2). 
1. The magistrate confused the mens rea requirement for issuing 
a bad check with the mens rea requirement for fraud. 
Defendant was charged with issuing a bad check to Morris Murdock under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-505 (1) (West 2004). R4-3. Under that section, a person is guilty of 
issuing a bad check if: (1) the person "issues or passes a check . . . for the payment of 
money"; (2) the person passes the check " for the purpose of obtaining from any person . . 
. any . . . property, or other thing of value . . ." ; (3) the person knows it will not be paid by 
the drawee"; and (4) "payment is refused by the drawee." 
It was undisputed the defendant issued the check to Sharon Warner, Morris 
Murdock's agent, for the purpose of obtaining eleven airline tickets to Hawaii and that the 
check did not clear the Wallaces' account. Rl96:46-50. Therefore, the only issue was 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that defendant knew the 
$11,496.30 check to Morris Murdock would not be paid. 
The magistrate, however, refused to bind over because the State did not show that 
defendant intended to defraud Morris Murdock when she issued the bad check. This was 
error. 
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In dismissing the bad check charge, the magistrate noted that defendant had argued 
that because the check was postdated, "it should only be regarded as a promise to pay in the 
future," and thus not actionable under the bad check statute.7 See Memorandum Decision, 
R150-141 at 147 (citing State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960, Utah 1953)) (Addendum C). The 
magistrate also noted, however, that the statute did apply "if there was a misrepresentation 
made at the time the check was written." Id. The magistrate then found "that the State failed 
to present evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of 
misrepresentation." Id. 
The magistrate discussed its rationale for dismissal as follows: 
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the 
defendant wrote the checks with the knowledge that there would be sufficient 
funds based upon the Wallaces' history of debt. However, there was ample 
evidence at the preliminary hearing that the Defendants were expecting to 
receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and there was no 
evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant 
does not carry the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the 
large payout, but rather this burden rests solely upon the State to present some 
evidence that the Defendant's [sic] were engaging in fraud by misrepresenting 
the statement of expecting a substantial sum of mone> arriving from a business 
deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces were not 
relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds. 
The State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of 
receiving money was a misrepresentation and that the State can not meet its 
burden by merely presenting evidence of insufficient funds and failure to pay. 
7
 In fact, the check was actually predated, one day before the transaction. 
Rl 96:49. The State however does not dispute that both parties understood the check was 
to be held for several days. R196:48-49. See State v. Trogstad, 98 Utah 565,100 P.2d 564, 
566 (1940) (victim understood at the time check was given that there were insufficient funds to 
cover it and that it was to be held for a few days until it would be good). 
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R147-146 (emphasis added). The magistrate confused the mens rea requirement for issuing 
with the mens rea requirement for fraud. 
In 1953, when Bruce was issued, guilt for issuing a bad check required criminal 
conduct "with intent to defraud."8 
Section 76-6-505 (1), however, does not require an intent to defraud.9 Rather, "[t]he 
element of 'knowledge5 of the overdraft is now sufficient to support a conviction." State v. 
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983) (rejecting claim that the 1977 revision to the 
statute intended to retain the element as part of the offense and noting that "[t]he omission 
of the element in the revised statute logically can mean nothing but that the legislature's 
purpose deliberately was to remove such intent as an element of the offense.") 
8
 Prior to 1973, the bad check statute provided as follows: 
Any person who . . . wilfully, with intent to defraud, makes . . . or 
delivers any check,.. . knowing at the time . . . that the maker . . . has not 
sufficient funds in, or credit with said bank . . . for the payment of such 
check,.. . is punishable . . . . 
The making, . . . or delivering of such check, . . . shall be prima facie 
evidence of intent to defraud. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-20-11 (1953) (emphasis added). The complete statute is in 
Addendum A. 
9
 In 1973, section 76-20-11 was repealed, and the bad check statute was reenacted 
as section 76-6-505. 1973 Utah Laws 621. Although the section 76-6-505 has been 
amended several times since 1973, subsection (1), under which defendant was charged, 
has not. 
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Here, the magistrate impermissably added the element of fraudulent intent into the bad 
check offense. The magistrate stated that the "burden rests solely upon the State to present 
some evidence that the Defendant's [sic] were engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the 
statement of expecting a substantial sum of money arriving from a business deal. R146. The 
magistrate reinforced its mistaken focus when it stated "[t]he State must establish sufficient 
evidence that the Wallaces were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to 
provide the sufficient funds." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the magistrate believed 
that the State was required to show that the Wallaces were deliberately lying about money 
arriving to make the check good several days later. Finally, the magistrate's order granting 
dismissal of the charges expressly relied on "the State's fail[ure] to present any evidence of 
fraudulent intent when [defendant] instructed Morris Murdock Travel's agent to hold the 
check for a period of time until sufficient funds were deposited into the account." See Order, 
R191-188 at 191-190 (emphasis added). In sum, because the magistrate improperly 
augmented the State's burden for bindover by requiring the State establish evidence of 
defendant's fraudulent intent, an element not required by the bad check statute, the Court 
should reverse the magistrate's dismissal of the bad check charge (count 2). Even assuming 
that the magistrate's references to "fraudulent intent" are deemed to have been limited to 
defendant's knowing misrepresentation that there would be soon be sufficient funds to cover 
the check, it incorrectly concluded that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of that 
fact for bindover. 
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2. The magistrate incorrectly assigned to the State the burden of disproving 
defendant's putative defense when, instead, it should have viewed evidence 
that defendant would reasonably have known that there would be 
insufficient funds to cover the check most favorably to the prosecution. 
On July 18, 2002, defendant made a check to Morris Murdock for $11,496.30. 
R196:13-14.10 The check was drawn on the account of "Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC" at 
FarWestBank. R196:13-14. The check was dated July 17,2002. R196:49. Defendanthad 
told Ms. Warner earlier in the day, however, that presently there were not sufficient funds 
in the account and asked Ms. Warner to hold the check until the following Tuesday, July 23. 
R196:48. Later that day, defendant and her husband, George Wallace, delivered the check 
to Ms. Warner. R196:49. When Ms. Warner called the bank on Tuesday, she was informed 
that there were not sufficient funds to cover the check. Id. When she deposited the check 
sometime later, it was returned for insufficient funds. Rl 96:50. 
As stated above, to meet the bindover requirement, the State was only required to 
present evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that defendant knew that the 
$11,496.30 check to Morris Murdock would not be paid. 
"A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-2-103(2) (West 2004). 
10
 There is no direct evidence that defendant signed the check. However, the 
prosecutor's references that it was "her check" and that she was charged with issuing a 
bad check are not disputed. Rl 18, 161. 
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Here, the magistrate found that "there was ample evidence at the preliminary hearing 
that the Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an 
investment and there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation." 
R147. The magistrate continued, "[t]he Defendant does not carry the burden at the 
preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather this burden rests 
solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's [sic] were engaging in 
fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money arriving from 
a business deal." R147-146. 
The magistrate misapprehended the prosecution's burden at the bindover stage and 
its duty to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence favorably to 
the prosecution. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ J10. As the prosecutor pointed out, defendant proffered 
no evidence that the Wallaces were expecting a large sum of money. See Motion to 
Reconsider, R166-152 at 161. Rather, defendant's victims reported that she told them that 
they were expecting money. Id. Given the magistrate's duty to view the evidence favorably 
to the pro secution, the paucity of such evidence should have played no role in the 
magistrate's refusal to bind defendant over. 
In any case, there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant 
would have been "reasonably certain," that there would not be enough money in the account 
to cover the check to Morris Murdock only a few days later. Mr. O'Bryant, the State's 
investigator, testified that there was never enough money in the Imi Kaimana Enterprises, 
LLC account to cover the check "[b]y a large margin—[t]housands of dollars." R196:15. 
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Evidence that the Wallaces were in extreme financial straits at the time defendant 
delivered the check to Ms. Warner further supports that defendant would have been 
reasonably certain that the check to Morris Murdock would not clear by Tuesday, July 23. 
"The very kernel of the principle (either knowledge or intent) is that the fact of the uttering 
[a forged check] tends, in one way or another, to show the defendant's knowledge at the time 
in issue, either by the probable warning received, or by the improbability of innocent intent 
in repeated instances', and the assumption throughout is that the bare fact of utterance shows 
this." State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 P. 1065, 1066-67 (Utah 1924) (emphasis added). 
Over the preceding two and one-half years, 254 checks issued by the Wallaces were 
returned for insufficient funds. R196:9-10. See Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1083) 
(noting that testimony that previously passed bad checks supported that the defendant was 
reasonably certain that the check at issue would not clear, but that this evidence was not 
sufficient to support conviction for theft by deception in light of contrary evidence); Lanos, 
63 Utah 151, 223 P. at 1066-67 (evidence of the defendant's passing two uncharged forged 
checks, even without knowledge that they were forged, was relevant to prove the defendant's 
guilty knowledge that he passed a forged check in the instant case); Kelly v. State, 663 P.2d 
967, 972 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (evidence of contemporaneously issued bad checks 
admissible to prove intent or absence of mistake concerning charged check); People v. 
Jackson, 748 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (same). 
Further supporting that defendant knew the check to Morris Murdock would not be 
paid was defendant's contemporaneous issuance of two bad checks to Martinez and Horton. 
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In defendant's immediate presence, she wrote one check to Mr. Martinez for $3,000 and 
another one to Mr. Horton for $13,000. The checks were written on July 17, one day before 
the bad check to Morris Murdock was written. R:R196:13-14,41,43. Although the checks 
were written on a different account at Far West Bank, the Imi Kaimana Investment, LLC 
account, "there was never anything close to $ 13,000 in that account either before or after that 
check was written . . ." R196:11-12. That account was involuntarily closed less than a 
month after the check to Morris Murdock was written. R196:12. Every one of the twelve 
accounts of the Wallaces that Mr. O'Bryant investigated was involuntarily closed. R: 196:9-
10. The Wallaces admitted that the State's "Restitution/Victim List," "fairly accurately]" 
showed that they were indebted to at least twenty individuals or entities in the amount of 
$457,379.79. R196:30-32; State's Ex. 3. 
In addition to contemporaneously written bad checks and a recent history of hundreds 
of bad checks, defendant could no longer make payments on the house she and George 
Wallace purchased from the Stonely s at the time she delivered the check to Morris Murdock. 
Defendant made no payments from May 2002 through November 28, 2002, when the 
Wallaces deeded the house back to the Stonelys. State's Ex. 3, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, "Legal and Financial Report - 8/1/96 — 11/06/02 and Ex. P, "Short Missed 
Payments." In the preceding four and one-half years, the Wallaces missed or shorted 
payments in about 40 months. Id. At the time of the bad check to Morris Murdock, the 
Wallaces owed the Stonelys over $50,000. R: 100; State's Ex. 2, Ex. P. Finally, Deborah 
and George Wallace's constant litany of big deals coming to fruition and promises to pay 
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their creditors "by Tuesday," when, in fact, the purported funds rarely materialized to support 
their promises, is strong circumstantial evidence that defendant knew that by the time he 
delivered the check to Morris Murdock, it would not be paid. Cf. Kollar v. State, 556 N.E.2d 
936, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (conviction for theft by false pretenses supported by pattern 
of repeated promises of delivery of goods to multiple victims, followed by lulling purchasers 
with excuses for failure to perform long after the defendant should have been aware that his 
business was failing); Baker v. State, 588 So.2d 945, 948 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (affirming 
conviction for theft by deception based on intent to defraud on failure to perform promises 
in similar instances and subsequent evasive conduct and delaying tactics). 
Here, long after the date on which the b ad check to Morris Murdock would 
purportedly clear, defendant repeatedly told Ms. Warner that a large amount of money was 
coming in and that she should just hold off a few more days. R196:50-51. Using the same 
refrain, George Wallace repeatedly put off Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton for months with 
claims that he was expecting a "big deal" to come through and that "[w]e should have your 
money for you by this next Tuesday or Wednesday." R: 196:37. Similarly, defendant put off 
the Stonelys for months with promises of performance, while she and George Wallace 
repeatedly missed or sent short payments on the house for months and years afterward. See 
State's Ex. 2, Ex. I (defendant's emails stating that results from projects she and her husbnd 
were working on would yield results shortly). Similarly, the Wallaces put off Ms. Stone, 
Tradewinds' booking agent, after defendant's check was returned for insufficient funds: "Just 
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continual telephone conversations about how funds were being processed from their many 
ventures and that we would be paid [and] to please be patient." State's Ex. 1 at p.l. 
None of defendants' purported expectations produced any payments to their victims, 
nor did any proceeds from their purported ventures protect his bank accounts from 
involuntarily closures. In sum, in light of the hundreds of bad checks that defendant and her 
husband wrote during the preceding two and one-half years, the enormity of their admitted 
debt, and undisputed testimony that there was never enough money in the account to cover 
the check "[b]y a large margin—[t]housands of dollars" (R196:15), there was substantial 
evidence supporting a reasonable belief that defendant knew with "reasonable certainty" that 
the check she delivered to Morris Murdock would not clear the following Tuesday. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over and dismissing the felony 
information against defendant on a charge of issuing a bad check (count 2) should be 
reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding defendant over for trial on that 
charge. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
\ 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
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In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral arg 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
- # 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this }±_ day of October, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Jennifer K. Gowans, Fillmore Spencer, LLC, Provo, Utah 
84604, this 74 day of October, 2005. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
PENAL CODE [1945] 
76-20-11. Checks, drafts or orders against insufficient funds—Evidence* 
—Any person who for himself or as the agent or representative of an-
other or as an officer of a corporation, wilfully, with intent to defraud, 
makes or draws or utters or delivers any check, or draft orjorder upon 
any bank or depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation, « r the pay-
ment of money, knowing at the time of such'making, drawing, uttering 
or delivering that the maker or drawer or the corporation has not suf-
ficient funds in, or credit with said bank or depositary, or person, or 
firm, or corporation, for the payment of such checks, draft or order, in 
full upon its presentation, although no express representation is made 
with reference thereto, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail 
for not more than one year, or in the state prison for not more than 14 
years. 
The making, drawing, uttering or delivering of such check, draft or 
order as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. 
Where such check, draft or order is protested, on the ground of 
insufficiency of funds or credit, the notice of protest thereof shall be 
admissible as proof of presentation, nonpayment and protest and shall be 
presumptive evidence of insufficiency of funds or credit with such bank 
or depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation. 
The word "credit" as used herein shall be construed to mean an 
arrangement or understanding with the bank or depositary, or person, o* 
firm or corporation, for the payment of such check, draft or order. 
History: O. 1943, 103-18-11, enacted by 
L. 1945, ch. 87, § 1. 
C621] Penal Code 11973] ch. 196 
Section 76-6-505. (1) Any person who issues or passes a check for 
the payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of 
value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing, 
it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee 
is guilty of issuing a bad check. 
(2) For purposes of this section, a person who issues a check for 
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check 
would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or series of checks made or drawn in this state with-
in a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of not more than 
$100, such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or checks drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $100 but not more 
than $1,000, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor. • 
(c) If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $1,000 but not 
more than $2,500, such offense shall be a felony of the third degree. 
(d). If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $2,500, such of-
fense shall be a second degree felony. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 2 - 1 0 3 . Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circum-
stances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-2-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 4. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 5 0 5 . Issuing a bad check or draft—Presumption 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for 
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or 
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails 
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused 
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or 
draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this 
state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less 
than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds 
$300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds 
$1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds 
$5,000, the offense is a second degree felony. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-505; Laws 1977, c. 91, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 92, § 1; Laws 
1995, c. 291, § 16, eff. May 1, 1995. 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 1102, RELIABLE HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EX-
AMINATIONS 
(a) Statement of the Rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal prelimi-
nary examinations. 
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary 
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes: 
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary 
examination; 
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any 
exhibit; 
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records; 
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records; 
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer; 
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense 
which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in accordance 
with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed 
verbatim which is: 
(A) under oath or affirmation; or 
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement 
made therein is punishable. 
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of 
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay evidence 
is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the 
hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if: 
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is 
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly 
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests 
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice. 
[Adopted effective April 1, 1999.] 
ADDENDUM B 
Fourih Judicial District C 
ofUtah County, State of L> 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE AND DEBORAH WALLACE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 031403946; 031403948 
Date: November 30, 2004 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed and 
considered all relevant memoranda and hearings, now makes the following ruling: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Counts 1-5 of the Information apply to Defendant, Deborah Wallace. 
2. Counts 6-11 of the Information apply to Defendant, George Wallace. 
3. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 1 with issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, for 
a check that was written to Don Horton in the amount of $13,000 and for a $3,000 check 
written to Edward Martinez. These checks were written on July 17, 2002. Mrs. Wallace 
told both Mr. Horton and Martinez that her account lacked sufficient funds and instmcted 
them to wait a few days before cashing the checks, as she was expecting sufficient funds 
to be deposited into her account. However, when the gentlemen attempted to cash the 
checks, there was insufficient funds. 
4. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 2, issuing a bad check, and Mr. Wallace, theft by 
deception, for a check written by Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel in the amount 
of approximately $11,000 on July 18, 2002. The check was dated July 17, 2002, and Mr. 
Wallace asked the agent, Sharon Warner, to not cash the check for a few days because 
there was not sufficient funds in the account that the check was drawn on, but that 
sufficient funds were expected to arrive from a business deal. However, the sufficient 
funds did not arrive and the check did not clear. 
5. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 3 and Mr. Wallace in Count 8 for Communication 
Fraud, which involves a transaction between Mrs. Wallace and Catryna Faux. Mrs. Faux 
performed housekeeping services and Mrs. Wallace still owed her about $1,063 in back 
wages. Mrs. Faux testified that while she lived in Springville, Utah she had loaned 
money to Mrs. Wallace on three separate occasions. The first two loans were repaid, but 
the third one, amounting to $1,129.32 was not repaid. Mrs. Faux and her husband then 
voluntarily traveled with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace to Hawaii, with the promise of jobs. 
While in Hawaii the Wallaces borrowed additional money from the Fauxs. 
6. In September 2002, the Wallaces persuaded the Fauxs to attend a NuSkin convention in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Wallaces told the Fauxs that they would pay them $6,000 
when they arrived at the convention, based upon monies the Wallaces were expected to 
receive. When the Fauxs arrived in Utah, they learned the Wallaces did not receive the 
funds and "that it was a big mess." Whereupon the Fauxs moved back to Utah, as they 
could not afford to remain in Hawaii. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that 
"I know [the Wallaces] felt bad about not getting the money, and [Mrs. Wallace], you 
know, in good will, said, 'We'll pay you back for those expenses."' PLH Trans, at 67. 
7. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 4 and Mr. Wallace in Count 10 for Communication 
Fraud. These charges stem from a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. The 
Wallaces and the Stonelys entered into a contract for the sale of the Stonelys' home. 
However, the defendants became delinquent in payments between September of 1997 and 
June of 2002. In addition, the defendants also failed to pay property taxes. The Wallaces 
were delinquent in the amount of $57,714.40. As a result of the delinquency, the 
Wallaces signed a warranty deed, deeding the property back to the Stonelys "in payment 
of all monies owing." PLH Trans, at 75. 
8. Mrs. Wallace is charged with Count 5 and Mr. Wallace with Count 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, to include all other creditors that were not repaid by the Wallaces. 
9. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 6, theft by deception, for an agreement he entered into 
with Mr. Horton. Mr. Horton loaned the defendant $10,000 to make an investment. The 
e 
-2-
defendant was unable to repay Mr. Horton the principal or interest when the amount came 
due. 
10. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 9, issuing a bad check. However, the State fails to 
provide the Court with sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge. 
11. The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was conducted on April 7, 2004, after which the 
Court took the issue of binding over the charges under advisement and to allow counsel 
to brief the issue. 
12. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, whereupon the State filed a motion in 
opposition. Oral Arguments were held on October 19, 2004. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is "ferreting out. . . groundless and improvident 
prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 504 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 ( 2004). hi order to bind a defendant 
over at a preliminary hearing, the Court must find that there is probable cause sufficient to 
establish the "crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." Id. 
(citations omitted). "In making a determination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the 
prosecution." Id 'The defendant should be bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim." Id, The State must present a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995)(citation omitted). 
I. Count 1, issuing a bad check, is dismissed because the checks were not written for value. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check for events arising out of 
checks that were written to Mr. Horton and Mr. Martinez on July 17, 2002. To support a charge 
of Issuing a Bad Check, the State must establish that the defendant drafted a check for payment 
with the purpose of receiving something of value knowing that the check would not be honored 
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due to insufficient funds. The State supports its position based upon the insufficient funds. 
However, the State must establish that the checks were written for exchange of value. Issuing a 
check for exchange of value is an essential element that the State must satisfy. The State argued 
that something of value was exchanged because the elimination of debt should be considered 
value. This Court disagrees. The facts of the case clearly show that on July 17, 2002, when Mrs. 
Wallace wrote the checks, neither Mr. Martinez or Horton were given any new value to the 
defendants. See Howell Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). It was nothing more than a 
promise to pay in the future, without adding new or additional terms to previous agreement that 
arose from the July 2, 2001 transactions. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 is 
granted. 
II. Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the 
State fails to establish misrepresentation by Mrs, Wallace, nor does the State establish 
actual deception by Mr. Wallace. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 2, Issuing a Bad Check, and George Wallace is 
charged with Count 7, Theft by Deception, for events arising out of checks that were written by 
Mrs. Wallace to Moms Murdock Travel. The Defendant argues that because Murdock Travel 
agreed to withhold depositing the check for a few days that the check falls out of the definition of 
a check, which must be payable on demand, and that it should be regarded as only a promise to 
pay in the future. The Defendant cites State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953) in support of her 
position. In Bruce, the Utah Supreme Court stated that postdated checks did not fall under the 
bad check statute, however, the statute applied if there was misrepresentation made at the time 
the check was written. This Court finds that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to 
establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of misrepresentation. 
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the defendant wrote the 
checks with the knowledge that there would be insufficient funds based upon the Wallaces' 
history of debt. However, there was ample testimony at the preliminary hearing that the 
Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and 
there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant does 
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not cany the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather 
this burden rests solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's were 
engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money 
arriving from a business deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces 
were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds. The 
State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of receiving money was a 
misrepresentation and the State can not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of 
insufficient funds and a failure to pay. 
Moreover, as pertaining to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State is required to establish 
some evidence that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that is false, 
fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct 
that is not true, or promises performances that he does not intend to preform. Here, the State has 
failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact 
that Morris Travel would be repaid. The evidence at the preliminary hearing established that Ms. 
Warner, an employee of Murdock Travel, dealt exclusively with the Defendant's wife and not the 
Defendant. Therefore, since the State is unable to satisfy all elements of the charges, the 
defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 7 is granted. 
III. COUNT 3 & 8, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State failed to establish 
that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to defraud the Fauxs of at least $5,000. 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of dealings with the Fauxs. To bind over for a charge of Communication 
Fraud, a second degree felony, the State must establish that the defendants devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud another of at least $5,000 or something other than monetary value, and that the 
events occurred in Utah County, Utah. The State contends that the Fauxs were defrauded out of 
$7,286.83. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that in Utah County the following 
debts were made by Mrs. Wallace: $1,129.32 of which Deborah borrowed from Mrs. Faux to pay 
for her son's rent-a-car, and for $1,063 in wages for Mrs. Faux's employment as a housekeeper in 
Springville, Utah. However, based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, the 
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remaining transactions all occurred in Hawaii and not in Utah County, Utah and therefore those 
transactions can not be calculated in the total figure to establish communication fraud. 
Therefore, since the monetary value that was accrued in Utah County, Utah does not exceed 
$5,000 the State is unable to establish probable cause as to all elements of the charge. 
In addition, this Court finds that the debt that accrued in Utah County, Utah does not 
amount to communication fraud. Based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, 
it was established that on previous occasions that the defendants did repay money on previous 
loans they owed the Fauxs, which is contrary to the State's position. Moreover, no testimony 
was presented at the Preliminary Hearing to show that the Wallaces' expectation of funding was 
fraudulent. Since intent to defraud is an essential element of Communication Fraud, and the 
State failed to satisfy this element, this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts 3 
and 8, Communication Fraud. 
IV COUNT 4 & 10, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State has failed to 
establish that the delinquent mortgage and tax payments was an intent to defraud the 
Stonelvs. 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. To bindover a 
communication fraud the State must satisfy its burden by presenting some evidence of a scheme 
or artifice to defraud another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises 
or material omissions. However, the State supports its position by claiming that delinquent 
payments is sufficient to establish communication fraud and that the defendants were spending 
money to finish the basement instead of paying their other debts. These assertions are not 
sufficient to satisfy the State's burden. The State fails to present any evidence of a scheme or 
artifice. Moreover, delinquent payments are not sufficient to establish probable cause of an 
intent to defraud. Finally, this Court finds that the fact that the Stonelys executed and recorded, 
through their attorney, a warranty deed expressly satisfying an> and all obligations owed by the 
Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's position that the Wallaces intended to defraud 
the Stonelys. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 10 is granted. 
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V. Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful activity, are dismissed because the Wallaces do not 
constitute an enterprise, nor does their conduct constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as 
defined by statute. 
Both defendants are charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity. To bind over Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, the State must establish that probable cause exist that the Wallaces constitutes 
an enterprise and of a pattern of unlawful activity. An ''enterprise" means any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities." U.C.A. section 76-10-1602(1). The State contends that the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise under the statute, but the State fails to articulate how the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise, other than the mere fact that they are mamed to each. The State failed to 
present any evidence or authority to establish that a mamed couple constitutes an enterprise as 
defined by the statute, hi a recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals states that "[a]n 'association 
in fact' enterprise 'is provided by evidence of an ongoing organization formal or informal, and by 
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.'" State v. Bradshaw, 508 
Utah.Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 2004)(citations omitted). An enterprise is a "continuing unit 
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 
(Utah App. 1988)(stating that the individuals had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose 
of making money with the sale of drugs). The State cites no authority suggesting that marriage 
creates an enterprise. Courts have universally rejected attempts to extend the scope of 
antiracketeering laws and to reject efforts "to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in 
RICO clothing." Bradshaw, 508 Utah.Adv. Rep at 16. This Court finds that the mere fact that 
the Wallaces are married does not constitute an enterprise. It is the conclusion of this Court that 
it was not the legislative intent to include marriages as an enterprise within the scope of the 
statute scheme to constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as contemplate in U.C.A. section 76-
10-1602(1). 
Furthermore, the Wallaces pattern of debt does not constitute unlawful pattern of activity 
as described by the statute. The statute requires at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but are the same or similar. Such activities that are prohibited 
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are theft by deception or communication fraud. However, as stated previously, this Court finds 
that the conduct of the Wallaces do not amount to acts of either commercial fraud or theft by 
deception. Moreover, this Court finds that the defendants did not use or invest the money they 
borrowed in a proscribed manner, as required by the statute. The 'language of the statute is clear 
that defendants] must 'use or invest5 the proceeds from the unlawful activity in the proscribed 
manner, namely the 'acquisition,' 'establishment,' or 'operation of an 'enterprise.'" Id.; See 
State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988)("[UPUAA} makes it a crime to use the profits 
of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise."); and Accord State v. 
Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)("A [RICO} violation occurs not when the 
defendant engages in the predicate acts, but only when he uses or invests the proceeds of that 
activity in an enterprise.'")(citation omitted). 
Therefore, this Court grants the Defendants motion to dismiss Counts 5 and 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity. 
VI COUNT 6, Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the State failed to show actual 
deception by the defendant when he persuaded Mr. Horton to loan him $10,000. 
Theft by deception requires that the State prove the defendant created or confirmed by 
words or conduct a fact that is false, fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created 
or confirmed by words or conduct that is not true, or promises performances that he does not 
intend to preform. The State contends that Mr. Wallace committed a theft by deception by 
entering into an agreement to have Mr. Horton make an investment of $10,000, without 
intending to repay him. However, the only evidence the State presents to support its contention 
is the defendant's failure to repay. The State did not provide any evidence regarding the nature 
of the investment and whether the investment was fraudulent. There was no evidence presented 
to establish whether there was either a fictitious investment project or whether the money was 
actually invested but that the project failed to perform as had been expected by the Defendant. 
The fact that the money was not repaid is insufficient to establish an intent to deceive; the State 
must present some evidence that a "big deal" was not legitimately expected by the defendant and 
that the lack of repayment was not a result of commercial misfortune. Furthermore, there was 
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testimony presented that the agreement between the defendant and Mr. Horton took place 
simultaneously when the defendant and Mr. Martinez entered into the identical agreement. Mr. 
Martinez received full repayment of the loan's principal which supports the position that the 
defendant possessed the intent to repay, rather than to deceive. In addition, there was evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing that there had been a history of paying debts to Mr. 
Martinez. 
The State failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false 
impression of fact that Mr. Horton would be repaid. Not every unfilled promise is turned into 
deception. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983). A lack of repayment is insufficient 
to establish probable cause that the defendant intended to defraud either Mr. Horton or Mr. 
Martinez. This Court finds that there lacks probable cause to bindover Count 6 and that this 
charge is dismissed. 
VII The State fails to provide sufficient facts for Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check. 
This issue was not raised in either the State's or the Defendant's motion, nor was it 
discussed in oral arguments. Since this Court was not given sufficient facts to determine the 
nature of this charge, Count 9 is dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence presented to the Court at the Preliminary Hearing; Oral Arguments 
and Memorandums, this Court finds that the State has been unable to establish probable cause for 
each and every element of the charges. Moreover, this Court finds that the State failed to meet its 
burden to show that the defendants conduct raised to the level of theft and fraud, rather than mere 
commercial misfortune. Therefore this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss all 
counts. The Defendants are to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
On a final note, it appears, based upon the facts of this case and the arguments presented 
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by the State, that the State is making the statement that there should be a policy to criminally 
charge individuals who run into financial difficulties, are unable to pay debts, file for bankruptcy, 
have foreclosed on their mortgage, or who fail to meet their contractual obligations, and that 
these debtors should be subject to criminal sanctions, along with any potential civil actions. In 
these situations, there are often a multitude of unpaid debts to various creditors, however, it is 
clear that the criminal courts are not the proper avenue to deal with these situations, nor should 
they be used to convert ordinary civil debt into criminal restitution. 
DATED this . day of November, 2004. 
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE WALLACE, and DEBORAH 
WALLACE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASENOS. 031403946, 031403948 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
These matters came before the Court for preliminary hearing on April 7, 2004. 
Present were Dave Wayment appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, Gunda Jarvis on behalf 
of George Wallace ("George"), and Jennifer Gowans on behalf of Deborah Wallace 
("Deborah"). The Court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to 
brief issues relative to the bind-over. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on 
November 30, 2004, wherein it found that all charges should be dismissed because the 
State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing, to wit: 
Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check: The State failed to present any evidence that 
Deborah drafted a check for payment with the purpose of receiving something 
of value, or that she did so knowing that the check would not be honored due to 
insufficient funds. 
Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception: Relative to 
Count 2, the State failed to present any evidence of fraudulent intent when 
000191 
Deborah instructed Morris Murdock Travel's agent to hold the check for a 
period of time until sufficient funds were deposited into the account. 
As to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State failed to establish any 
evidence that George created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that was 
false, or that he failed to correct a false impression that he created or confirmed 
by words or conduct that was not true, or that he promised performance that he 
did not intend to perform. Moreover, the evidence established that Ms. Warner 
dealt exclusively with Deborah. 
Counts 3 & 8, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, because the 
monetary value that accrued in Utah was less than $5,000, the State is unable as 
a matter of law to meet the value element of these charges. Further, the State 
presented no evidence that the Defendants' communications were made with 
any intent to defraud, or that the Wallaces engaged in a scheme or artifice. To 
the contrary, Ms. Faux testified that she believed the Defendants acted in good 
faith and were simply unable to meet their financial obligations due to 
unforeseen economic hardship. 
Counts 4 & 10, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, the State 
has failed to establish any evidence of a scheme or artifice to defraud or to 
obtain anything of value. Further, the undisputed fact that the Stonelys 
executed and recorded a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all 
obligations owed by the Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's 
position that the Wallaces intended to defraud the Stonelys, or that the Wallaces 
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engaged in a scheme or artifice, or that they received anything of value. 
Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful Activity: The State has failed to establish 
any evidence or cite to any authority that the Wallaces are an enterprise or that 
their conduct constituted a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by statute. 
The mere fact that the Wallaces are married is not sufficient to establish an 
enterprise within the scope contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(1). 
Furthermore, the Wallaces' pattern of debt does not constitute a pattern of 
unlawful activity as defined by the controlling statute; nor does it arise to the 
level of criminal conduct, as previously noted herein. Moreover, the State has 
completely failed to present any evidence that the defendants used or invested 
the proceeds from the alleged illegal activity for the acquisition, establishment, 
or operation of an enterprise. 
Count 6, Theft by Deception: The State has failed to establish any evidence 
that George had any intent to deceive Mr. Horton, or that George created, 
confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact regarding repayment, or 
that the failure to repay was anything more than commercial misfortune. 
Rather, the evidence showed that George intended to repay the loan. The mere 
lack of repayment is insufficient to establish probable cause as to the essential 
element of intent to defraud. 
Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check: This issue was not raised in either the State's 
or the Defendant's motion, and was not discussed at oral arguments. The Court 
was not given sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge. 
3 
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In summary, each of the State's creditor-witnesses testified that the Wallaces 
were expecting a large sum of money with which to pa) all their debts. There was no 
testimony or inference that this expectation was a misrepresentation. To the contrary, the 
State's evidence includes that the Wallaces have a history of repaying their debts, they 
signed a warranty deed returning residential property to the sellers after the Wallaces 
made improvements, and that the Wallaces acted in good faith. None of the State's 
witnesses testified that the Wallaces intended to defraud anyone, nor can the same be 
inferred in light of the substantial evidence to the contrary. In short, this case represents 
an improper attempt to use the criminal justice system as a means to collect a civil debt. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that all the charges in the Information 
are hereby dismissed. 
BY THE COURT this 31 day of January, 2005.
 %0 - , 
Jud 
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Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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Gunda Jarvis 
Attorney for George Wallace 
Utah County Public Defender Association 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
SUPPLEMENTATION OF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : RECORD CITATIONS TO 
STATE'S OPENING BRIEF 
v. : 
DEBORAH WALLACE, : No. 20050190-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
The State of Utah, by and through Kenneth A. Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, 
hereby supplements the State's opening brief with record citations, viz., page numbers 
assigned to paginated exhibits supplemented to the record following the filing of the State's 
opening brief, as follows: 
6 3rd par. . . . the Wallaces owed them more than $450,000. R138:8,10; State's Ex. 3, 
R206-205. 
9 1st par. . . . but only the one for $301.24 cleared defendant's account. Rl38:43-44; 
State's Ex. 4, Donald Horton's 1102 statement, R204-202. 
9 3rd par. ... and interest then owed. R138:72-73; State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, Ex. A and P. R243-240. 209. 
FILED 
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NOV 1 8 2005 
9 fn.3 . . . bearing on counts 4 and 10 (State's Ex. 2, R246-207) 
10 2nd par. . . . a deficit totaling $51,111.13. R100; State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, R209. 
10 1st par. . . . by renting the estate. R138:72-73; State's Ex. 1, 1102 statement of 
Peggy Young, Tradewinds' booking agent R269, 266. 
10 1st par. . . . $8,000 amonth beginning July 1,2002. R138:15-16; State's Ex. 1, 1102 
statement of Peggy Young, booking manager for Tradewinds, R266-265. 
11 fn. 4 The 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1, R269-
247) 
11 1st par. . . . plus a late fee, on the estate. State's Ex. 1, R269. 
11 1st par. . . . That check did not clear. State's Ex. 1, R269. 
11 1st par. . . . another individual's credit card. State's Ex. 1, R269. 
11 1st par. . . . for $3,096.84 to partially cover the first month's rent. State's Ex. 1, 
R269. 
11 lstpar. . . . was returned for insufficient funds. R138:15,17-19; State'sEx. 1, R211. 
12 . . . "Restitution/Victim List, was "fairly accurate." R138:30-32; State's Ex. 
3, R206-205. The list compiled the Wallaces indebtedness to numerous 
persons and entities, including victims of the charged offenses, totaling 
$457,379.79. State's Ex. 3, R206-205. 
23 delivered the check to Morris Murdock. State's Ex. 3, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, "Legal and Financial Report - 8/1/96 — 11/06/02, R244 and Ex. 
P, "Short Missed Payments," R209. In the preceding four and one-half years, 
the Wallaces missed or shorted payments in about 40 months. Id. At the 
time of the bad check to Morris Murdock, the Wallaces owed the Stonelys 
over $50,000. R:100; State's Ex. 2, Ex. P, R209. 
24 2nd par. . . . payments on the house for months and years afterward. See State's 
Ex. 2, Ex. I, R224-21. 
25 1st par. . . . we would be paid [and] to please be patient." State's Ex. 1 at p.l, R269. 
2 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2005 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Supplementation of 
Record Citations to the State's Opening Brief, was mailed, postage prepaid, to Jennifer K. 
Gowans, Fillmore Spencer, LLC, attorneys for defendant Provo, Utah 84604 this 18th day of 
November, 2005. 
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